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Abstract 
 
The  present  text  tackles  the  old  problem  of  artistic  autonomy  given  the 
constitutive heteronomy of post-conceptual artistic practices in terms of their 
medium-specificity. Instead of considering the idea of artistic autonomy as a 
modernist prejudice to be discarded, I suggest that it may be revised as the 
performative  autonomy  of  discourse  against  ideological  uses  of  language, 
given that conceptual art is considered as practice and activity rather than 
the  production  of  objects.  Resistance  may  be  itself  redefined  as  the 
performative  re-articulation  of  language  within  its  conventional  use. 
Therefore, if aesthetic formalism tried to achieve the autonomy of art in the 
social sphere by means of medium-specificity, whereas early conceptualists 
strolled  towards  a  functionalist  type  of  artistic  autonomy  in  the  artistic 
sphere,  contemporary  post-conceptual  practices  revised the  very  concept  of 
form as the critical communicative articulation of the social sphere. 
 
Keywords:  Artistic  autonomy,  conceptual  art,  performativity,  ideology, 
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1.  Conceptualism and the “Post-Medium” Condition 
of Art 
 
Defining  conceptual  art,  or  at  least,  circumscribing  its 
scope and explaining its particularities within the vast array of 
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contemporary  art  seems  an  almost  self-contradictory  task, 
given the anti-formalist dimension of the early conceptual art 
manifestations – which also means that it was meant to be less 
a particular style and more a radical re-evaluation of the very 
concept  of  art.  In  whatever  terms  we  may  retrospectively 
describe  it,  conceptualism  was,  first  of  all,  an  anti-formalist 
attitude  rather  than  a  formal  innovation  in  terms  of  the 
canonical  language  of  art.  At  least  in  what  concerns  the 
development  of  contemporary  art  in  Northern  America  and 
Great  Britain,  conceptual  art  reacted  with  artists  such  as 
Joseph  Kossuth  or  John  Latham  against  the  dominant 
Greenbergian aesthetic paradigm and its formalist criteria for 
defining or understanding art (Wood 2004, 297-8; Morgan 1996, 
3-27; Colpitt 2004).  
Attempting  yet  to  circumscribe  its  essential 
characteristics  in  terms  of  the  use  of  the  artistic  language, 
conceptualism might be briefly described as an “art of the mind” 
[instead of the senses] (Wood 2002, 6). It might also be defined 
formally as a distinct artistic genre or language informed by the 
neo-avant-gardes broader reaction to the aesthetics and values 
prompted by abstract expressionism (Wood 2004, 296-8). That 
is, it can be defined by means of its medium specificity, as an 
art  of  language  –  “a  kind  of  art  of  which  the  material  is 
language”  or  as  an  art  in  which  verbal  (spoken  or  written) 
language  and  its  “dematerialization”  towards  the  purely 
conventionalized  (and  thus,  intellectualized)  significance 
replaces  the  visual  language  of  images  and  the  material 
presence  of  the  signifier  (Morley  2003,  142).  Thus,  it  can  be 
defined as “an art of ideas”, as it was defined both by the artists 
themselves as exemplified by Sol Le Witt’s “Paragraphs…” or 
Joseph Kosuth’s art series Art as Idea as Idea, and by art critics 
and  theorists  with  clear  expressions  such  as  “information  or 
idea art” (Lippard 2001, xv).  
In the above-mentioned terminology it is paramount that 
“idea” (understood both as a preparatory sketch or project for 
the accomplishment of an artistic action or work, or as cognitive 
meaning)  plays  the  crucial  part  instead  of  its  material 
presentation.  Considered  a  direct  heir  of  Duchamp’s  anti-
aesthetic  ready-mades,  conceptual  art  is  itself  usually Cristian Nae / Artistic Autonomy in the “Post-Medium Condition” of Art 
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interpreted  as  an  anti  or  an-aesthetic  artistic  manifestation, 
because it renders irrelevant the sensuous appearance of the 
artwork,  thus  shifting  the  focus  of  artistic  appreciation  from 
artistic  morphology  to  functionalist  questions  and  criteria 
(Kosuth 2002, 18).  
Such  a  decisive  accent  may  have  led  some  of  its  early 
commentators  to  suggest  the  well-known  label  of 
“dematerialized” art for the type of artistic practices associated 
with conceptualism (Lippard 2001, xvii and 42). Nevertheless, 
it has become quickly paramount that, even if conceptual art 
highlights the cognitive dimension of art and its intellectualized 
reception  and  experience,  the  thinking  process  has  to  be 
communicated through a sensible medium (Lippard 2001, 43). 
What has become clear with conceptualism is rather that idea 
can be conveyed through multiple or virtually any medium.  
It  seems  logical,  therefore,  to  speak  about  the  “medium-
indifference” associated with conceptual art (Wood 2002, 97). This 
“indifference”  may  also  sum  up  the  conceptualist  condition  of 
contemporary art as a “post-medium condition” (Krauss 2000), in 
which  the  conceptualist  activity  of  reflection  pervades  all  other 
types  of  artistic  gestures.  In  Krauss’s  account,  this  condition 
reflects a conscious critical attitude towards the medium used by 
the  artists,  once  we  have  entered  the  era  when  virtually  any 
medium  may  be  used  to  convey  an  idea.  As  summarized  by 
Krauss, the major part played by conceptual art in this narrative 
seems  to  relate  to  the  basic  acknowledgement  of  art’s 
interdependence  on  its  related  systems  of  consumption  and 
production,  the  inherently  intermediary  and  interdependent 
structure of artistic expression (Krauss 2000, 32) in the ensemble 
of  cultural  discourses  and  its  engagement  with  the commercial 
system instead of an utopian denial of its mechanisms in search 
for  a  medium-specific  purity,  hence,  autonomy  of  art  (Krauss 
2000, 11).  
  
2.  Aesthetic Formalism and the Problem of Artistic 
Autonomy  
 
The precondition of this epochal shift in the definition 
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a  question  of  morphology  to  a  question  of  function”  (Kosuth 
2002, 17) is that the aesthetic evaluation and appreciation of 
art, at least in formal terms, bears no import on the function 
and nature of art. In Paul Crowther’s terms, in conceptual art 
the relationship between form and content becomes contingent 
(Crowther  1997,  178).  It  seems  reasonable,  then,  to  take  for 
granted the assumption that conceptual art plays a major role 
in  the  “anti-aesthetic”  tendency  to  be  noted  in  twentieth 
century  art,  understood  not  as  a  negation,  but  as  “a  critique 
that  destructures  the  order  of  representations  in  order  to 
reinscribe them” (Foster 1987, xv). The term also signals that 
the  aesthetic  realm  of  art  altogether,  as  separate  from  the 
(socio)political  field,  can  no  longer  sustain  per  se  the  critical 
attitude  of  resistance  required  from  art  in  the  postmodern 
conditions  of  an  ever-growing  cultural  industry  (Foster  1987, 
xvi).  
But if conceptual art is giving up both the formal and 
the aesthetic elements which may seclude the sphere of art as 
an autonomous public sphere in relation to social and political 
spheres and the dominant cultural discourses at a certain time, 
the old problem of artistic autonomy reappears in new terms. 
What sort of critical autonomy may still claim such an art in 
relation to the social sphere and its culture? Is it still possible 
to  differentiate  the  critical  potential  of  art  from  the  ways  of 
mass  culture  and cultural  industry  absorbing  images  into  its 
spectacular  regime  of  production  and  consumption,  given  the 
medium-heteronomy  and  the  inherent  dependency  of 
conceptual  art  to  the  non-artistic  spheres  of  everyday  life, 
politics and culture? Can conceptual art evade these problems 
by  stepping  out  altogether  from  the  realm  of  images  directly 
into their ideological frameworks of interpretations? And, most 
of  all,  is the  problem of  autonomy  an  obsolete  desire  and  an 
inappropriate claim in the new system of contemporary art?  
As Adorno warned us, the problem of artistic autonomy 
seemed to be more than a desirable formal condition of art in 
modernity  (Adorno  1997,  8-9).  Rather  it  turned  out  to  be  a 
necessary  (albeit  illusory)  strategy  of  aesthetic  resistance 
conceived  in  negative  terms,  served  to  guarantee  art’s  non-
assimilation into cultural industry – and thus, its critical and Cristian Nae / Artistic Autonomy in the “Post-Medium Condition” of Art 
435 
 
 
political potentials. The distinction between high and low art 
and  the  dialectic  between  the  artwork’s  formal  autonomy 
conceived as a social monad and its simultaneous embedding 
into  larger  structures  of  social  production  were  not  regarded 
necessarily as an obstacle, but rather as a necessary distance 
which is able to support critical judgment instead of collapsing 
into a passive reaction of immersed contemplation within the 
aesthetic experience of art. Now, given conceptual art’s embrace 
of  the  low  art’s  favorite  mediums  of  production,  that  is,  the 
machinery of mass media and its structures of promoting and 
distributing  information  (Alberro  2003,  100-10),  in  a  way 
similar to Pop Art’s collapse of the distinction between art and 
commercial  graphic  design  (and,  in  extenso,  between  a 
glamorous high art and the growing aestheticism of everyday-
life), one may as well suspect that, despite its austere looks and 
critical apparatus, conceptualism may have ultimately signed 
the documents of complete resignation in respect to the problem 
of artistic autonomy.  
This  problem  seems  to  become  even  more  important 
when the aesthetic dimension of autonomy is at stake, since the 
post-medium condition of art also seems to mean giving up the 
aesthetic autonomy of artistic experience and reception, which 
may have secluded the realm of art in the cultural sphere. How 
is then autonomy secured for a type of art that promoted itself a 
purification of art precisely from its aesthetic heteronomy?  
 There are at least two important questions related to the 
conceptualist demise of formal and aesthetic types of autonomy 
of art. First of all, we may criticize the formalist conventions of 
conceptual art, which in retrospect may have only expanded the 
formal  vocabulary  of  art  without  actually  replacing  the 
fundamental  modernist  presuppositions  of  Greenberg’s  four-
points  purist  definition  of  art  as  aesthetic  form.  On  the 
contrary,  as  several  authors  have  already  pointed  out  (Wood 
2004, 298; Colpitt 2004, 32-6), it may have presented a purist 
and  essentialist  hence  modernist  definition  of  art  in  simple 
negative terms. In Kosuth’s works, for instance, pure visuality 
is replaced by concepts or ideas; subjectivity is evacuated by the 
pure  “objectivity”  of  impersonal  (and  seemingly  authorless) 
statements;  sensuality  is  replaced  by  thinking,  reflective  and META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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interpretive processes; considered to be oppressive, “high art” is 
collapsed into “low art” or even no art at all – that is, into the 
realm  of  everyday-life  language,  practices  and  transactions; 
being considered before as the key factor in the definition of art, 
aesthetic value as an intrinsic value of the aesthetic object is 
explicitly  denied.  Among  his  arguments,  Colpitt  also  notes 
Kossuth’s insistence on the idea of art for art’s sake, while the 
insistence on tautology may also resemble Greenberg’s flatness 
of the canvas (Colpitt 2004, 34). Last but not least, Colpitt notes 
reductionism,  that  is,  the  elimination  of  unnecessary 
conventions as an important underlying intention of Kosuth’s 
investigations,  which,  according  to  Greenberg,  may  be 
considered  one  of  the  main  drives  of  modernist  progress  or 
advancement (Colpitt 2004, 36). 
This  means  that,  at  least  for  the  “early”  or  “pure” 
conceptualists such as Kosuth, the investigation into the nature 
and function of art initiated by conceptual or reflexive art, the 
problem of the autonomy is not only present, but also plays a 
key  role  in  the  process  of  investigation,  justifying  both  the 
search  for  essentialist  criteria  of  art  and  the  meta-artistic 
character  of  the  artistic  production  itself.  The  “conceptual” 
features of art are meant precisely to secure the autonomy of 
art in relation to the manipulation of image in popular culture 
or mass-media.  
But  the  same  problem  of  artistic  autonomy  becomes 
important  in  conceptual  art  in  what  concerns  its  entangled 
relationship  to  the  art  market,  its  conventions  and  ideology.  It 
may be argued that the formalist understanding of the autonomy 
of art, for which Kosuth is the best example, makes it blind to the 
options  of  direct  political  engagement,  thus  acquiring  at  best  a 
professional autonomy from the critical judgment and thus, failing 
to find a proper audience except for a narrow circle of “initiates” 
and peers (Stimson 2004, 290). It has been equally noticed that, in 
doing  so,  Conceptual  art  did  not  elude  art’s  constituent 
dependency  on  the  market  and  the  larger  cultural  industry, 
despite  its  innovations  concerning  the  systems  of  artistic 
distribution.  Thus,  the  utopia  according  to  which  ideas  were 
meant to be anti-commercial given the explicit denial of objecthood 
was considered to be failed (Lippard 2001, 264; Burn 1999, 320-333). Cristian Nae / Artistic Autonomy in the “Post-Medium Condition” of Art 
437 
 
 
Particularly,  conceptual  art  may  have  equally  been  prone  to  a 
fetishism of ideas, being constrained by an organizing principle 
borrowed  uncritically  from  the  world  of  work  and  engineering, 
that  of  “productivism”  or  “production  for  production’s  sake” 
(Stimson  2004,  283-91).  It  has  equally  been  accused  of  having 
served the interests of the market by promoting cheap goods for 
an economy affected by crisis (Smithson 1999, 284-5). Last but not 
least, the idea of a market-free economy of art has been criticized 
on  grounds  of  conceptual  art’s  embrace,  complicity  with  and 
eventual  incorporation  of  promotion  and  distributions  systems 
pertaining to mass-media and advertising (Alberro 2003).  
 
3.  Use  and  Function:  Conceptualist  Interventions 
and Critical Performativity  
 
Here we also may note that, essentially, conceptual art 
has  succeeded  in  highlighting  once  again  the  inherently 
communicative dimension of art. The idea of “dematerialization 
of the artistic object”, as Lippard dubbed the early conceptual 
artworks, plays an important part in understanding conceptual 
art  if  redefined  as  an  information-oriented  communicational 
structure of art, since in a “post-medium condition of art” the 
image of the artwork as an aesthetic object “to be looked at” is 
replaced  with  the  transmission  of  any  kind  of  information 
between the artist and its public (Alberro 2003, 10-17).  
It is also true that, in this process of radical redefinition 
of  art,  early  North  American  conceptualism  may  have  been 
infused with the cybernetic revolution proclaiming an ideal of 
communication  based  on  objective  and  positivist  knowledge 
borrowing terminology such as “art as software” and “system 
aesthetics” (Shanken 2004, 236-43), doubled by a strong belief 
in the power of language to convey ideas as transparently as 
possible  (Drucker  2004,  256-62).  Such  suppositions  may  also 
underpin  the  engagement  with  information  regarded  as  a 
democratic  gesture  for  some  conceptual  artists,  and  the 
important  position  played  by  written  text,  indexical  and 
documentary  photography  and  other  means  of  recording 
information  such  as  the  tape-recorded  ambiental  sound  in 
Christine Kozlov’s iconic work Information: No Theory (1979), META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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in which the process of constant remembering and erasure is 
expressed by the endless process of tape-recording all sounds in 
the  given  environment  during  the  exhibition  in  a  continuous 
loop, while simultaneously erasing the old ones registered on 
the  same  tape.  The  underpinning  ideology  describing  the 
tension between images and information is that, if images may 
be manipulated in their rhetoric force and given their complex 
visual  articulation,  written  text  may  acquire  objectivity  in 
artistic communication, since it adheres to a purely intellectual 
experience  of  reception.  Thus,  conceptual  art  may  also 
communicate in a democratic and collective manner, since the 
interpretive  competence  required  for  understanding  and 
responding to a text is no match for the interpretive complexity 
of an image. It also opens up a space of collective and inter-
subjective  reception  instead  of  the  subjective  and  emotional 
private space of reception required by aesthetic formalism.  
In  order  to  accommodate  both  the  perceptual 
indifference  and  the  conceptual  autonomy  of  the  artworks 
which seems to rest at the core of conceptual art as a critical 
gesture,  we  may  be  required  both  to  redefine  the  modernist 
concept of artistic form as the perceptual articulation of visual 
images, which is clearly inoperable here, and the subsequent 
concept  of  artistic  autonomy  associated  to  the  formalist 
tradition of autonomy as linguistic purity belonging to a specific 
evolutionary narrative of the medium itself. First of all, it is not 
necessary that artistic autonomy should be expressed as art for 
art’s sake (despite Kosuth’s obsessive interest in debating the 
nature and boundaries of art). In other words, the problem of 
autonomy  given  the  heteronomy  of  conceptual  art  as  an  art 
infused  into  usual  structures  of  communication  and 
representation  becomes  a  problem  of  linguistic  autonomy 
against  other  possible  uses  of  language.  The  problem  of  the 
autonomy  of  art  shifts  accordingly  “from  a  question  of 
morphology  to  a  question  of  function”  (as Kosuth  had  put  it) 
and becomes, therefore, in itself, a performative problem.  
Concerning  the  (postmodern)  question  of  the  post-
medium  condition  of  conceptual  art  and  consequently,  of 
contemporary art in broader terms, we may note that it did not 
immediately turn any artistic manifestation into a “conceptual” Cristian Nae / Artistic Autonomy in the “Post-Medium Condition” of Art 
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gesture.  In  fact,  as  Tony  Godfrey  noticed,  the  conceptualist 
artworks may be restricted to a quite limited array of favorite 
techniques  of  expression.  Accordingly,  the  artwork  itself  may 
consist broadly in four types of supports, all of which may have 
been considered to be non-artistic or at least to belong to the 
non-artistic sphere of everyday life and communication: ready-
mades,  interventions,  documentations  and  words  (Godfrey 
1998, 7). We may expand the last category according to the way 
words  are  used  into  written  text  in  order  to  produce  a 
spatialization  of  language, written texts  used  as  narrative  or 
documentary  device  meant  to  inscribe  or  instantiate 
temporality  (processes  or  events)  and  texts  used  as  a 
performative  device,  especially  exploiting  the  dimensions  of 
direct communication and orality, by means of conversations, 
formal  or  informal  dialogues  and  other  forms  of  collective 
discourse.  If  the  ready-mades  in  Godfrey’s  classification  may 
have  appeared  as  one  of  the  possible  and  major  artistic 
precedents  to  be  reprised  and  reconsidered,  the  use  of 
contextual  interventions  starting  over  from  the  performative 
dimension of placing an object in a situation, the documentation 
of  a  situation  or  an  event  and  the  textual  description  or 
statement  are  certainly  new  ways  of  understanding  art, 
appropriated (among others) from the legal and administrative 
language  (Buchloh  1997).  If  conceptual  art  focuses  on 
communicational and informational structures and sometimes 
borrows  these  structures  from  related  fields  such  as  the 
scientific language and analytic philosophy (Osborne 1999, 47-
65). For instance, it is the case of Joseph Kosuth’s insistence on 
tautology and analytical propositions, or of Art and Language’s 
use of an “academic philosophical jargon”. But other conceptual 
artists  also  analyse  the  transmission/replication/critique  of 
information  in  different  other  social  fields  such  as  law  and 
administration,  politics,  sociology  and  the  humanities.  Thus, 
conceptual  artists  more  often  highlight  impersonal  and 
intersubjective  formats  of  communication,  pointing  to  the 
conditions  of  discourse  and  perception  in  which  such  public 
communication  is  structured  in  present-day  social  life.  By 
means of an artistic use, these become aesthetic “forms” which 
only highlight conceptual art’s communicative potentiality.  META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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Moreover,  the  inherently  communicative  and 
performative  dimension  of  conceptual  art  as  the  heir  of 
Duchamp’s  critical  revolution  of  artistic  criteria  may  be  seen 
especially  in  the  interpretation  of  the  readymade  itself  as  a 
nominalist  gesture  (Duve  1999,  382-93).  This  interpretation 
takes  Duchamp’s  performative  gesture  of  proposing  the 
readymade  as  art  by  the  act  of  naming  as  the  key  artistic 
prerogative of contemporary art, the institutional gesture that 
brings artistic legitimacy to an object belonging to the sphere of 
the everyday-life. The conceptual intervention (such as naming 
the  infamous  object  “Fountain”)  is  thus  a  performative 
production  of  the  artwork,  an  intervention  which  turns  the 
object  into  art  –  “this  is  art”  (Duve  1999,  301-20).  Thus,  the 
conceptual  gesture  of  providing  a  new  name  for  an  ordinary 
object becomes the work of the artist and the transformative 
factor in relation to the ordinary object1. It is also remarkable 
that, according to a reading retrospectively influenced by the 
institutional critique art practices of the seventies, Duchamp’s 
work  may  be  conceived  as  the  gesture  of  provoking  and 
challenging  the  conventions  of  art  by  doubling  the  authorial 
instances (the invention of the fictitious author Richard Mutt), 
claiming the artistic status for an ordinary object and defending 
the imaginary author by means of an apologetic statement. This 
interpretation  turns  his  work  into  a  strategic  artistic 
intervention, based on authorial multiplication and conceptual 
recontextualization.  We  may  thus  redefine  the  uses  of 
documents  and  words  as  representing  strategic  forms  of 
interventions,  whereas  intervention  becomes  the  pivotal 
category in Godfrey’s classification, subordinating all the others 
as  alternative  modes  of  performativity.  Consequently,  the 
conceptualist  intervention  becomes  the  name  of  a  strategic 
performative  production  of  cultural  discourse.  But  the 
performative dimension of the conceptualist production artistic 
production seems to depend on the production of the speech-act 
in appropriate institutional conditions (that, is, the artist has 
the legitimacy to name something and performs such ritual into 
the appropriate institutional context). This only highlights the 
second problem associated with the conceptual art’s autonomy 
in  relation  to  the  institutional  conditions  and  conventions Cristian Nae / Artistic Autonomy in the “Post-Medium Condition” of Art 
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governing art, noted by Buchloh in his critique of conceptual 
art’s  early  gestures  belonging  to  a  formalist  “aesthetics  of 
administration” (Buchloh 1997, 117-20).  
 
4.  Some Supportive Examples: The Ideology of 
Language and its Conceptual Critiques 
 
Thus, we may arrive at the second major question, that 
is, how conceptual art as intervention may acquire its critical 
potential once its modes of expression are embedded into the 
ordinary channels of communication, that is, once medium has 
accepted  the  heterogeneous  and  heteronomous  modes  of 
production in relation to the material structures of production 
prevailing in the consumer’s society and the ordinary language 
and  ideology  in  totalitarian  systems  of  Eastern  Europe  and 
Southern Latin America. This takes us back to the question of 
the  power  of  performative  acts  which  may  explain  why 
interventions  may  be  more  desirable  than  the  production  of 
objects. We may briefly state that, with conceptualist gestures, 
the  critical  use  of  language  is  meant  to  pay  attention  to  the 
ideology  behind  an  image  or  a  discourse  –  that  is,  to  the 
naturalization of a belief or a discourse. 
Here  I  take  ideology  to  be  constituted  not  only  by  an 
explicitly  textual  set  of  statements,  but  also  by  unconscious 
beliefs and by the implicitly textual (or “discursive”) elements 
inscribed in an image which support, confine and make possible 
the  circulation  and  interpretation  of  that  and  other  related 
images in society, often regulating the rhetorical functions and 
uses of the image (associated with the “figural” regime of the 
image)  (Bryson  1981,  3-5).  Also,  in  a  Barthesian  vein,  I 
understand  ideology  as  “the  process  whereby  social  life  is 
converted  to  a  natural  reality”,  leading  to  “the  confusion  of 
linguistic  and  phenomenal  reality”  (Eagleton  1991,  2).  I  also 
think this specific notion of ideology as the naturalization and 
universalization  of  a  particular  set  of  dominant  values, 
accompanied  by  an  exclusionary  process  of  obliteration  and 
false conciliation of social antagonisms is particularly suited for 
approaching many (now) historical works of conceptual art of a META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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marked  performative  structure  taking  place  in  the  seventies 
and the early eighties. 
Such  a  redefinition  of  conceptual  art  as  (inherently)  a 
performative,  interventionist  practice  may  offer  a  clearer 
answer  to  the  problem  of  artistic  autonomy  as  a  pragmatic 
problem  related  to  the  critical  uses  of  language.  The  critical 
reuse  of  the  dominant  language  in  a  certain  cultural  and 
political space may define the way artistic autonomy may be 
obtained. Therefore, achieving autonomy relates to the critical 
gesture of dismantling or criticizing the dominant ideology at a 
certain time and in a specific cultural and social space.  
A few examples of such performative interventions may 
suffice to offer concrete art historical ground for the theoretical 
claims from above. When artists associated with institutional 
critique such as Hans Haacke make use of ready-made, that is, 
found  and  existing  documents,  consisting  in  notes  and 
photographs in order to debunk the ideology of the museum as 
a  corporative  structure  infused  with  capitalist  values  of 
profitability and hence as an interested institutional structure 
as  opposed  to  the  alleged  neutrality  of  its  purely  aesthetic 
function  and  values,  they  install  their  work  in  the 
communicative structures already existing in the context they 
intervene in. It is the case of Haacke’s well-known works such 
as  the  Manet  Projekt  74,  refused  by  the  Wallraf-Richartz 
Museum in Cologne and eventually realized in the Paul Menz 
Gallery in Cologne by exhibiting a color reproduction instead of 
the  original,  where  he  detailed  the  provenance  of  Manet’s 
Bunch of Asparagus, a piece who had entered the museum as a 
permanent loan from former Nazi patron and Deutsche Bank 
manager  Hermann  Joseph  Abs,  or  the  equally  controversial 
Shapolsky et al. Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, A Real Time 
Social System, as of May 1, 1971. The last art piece consisted of 
146 photographic views of New York buildings, six pictures of 
transactions, maps of New York districts and an explanatory 
wall. Each photograph was accompanied by a type-written text 
describing  the  location  and  the  financial  transactions  around 
each pictured building. By means of this work, Haacke discloses 
the transactions of a real-estate firm between 1951 and 1971 
whose influential owner was also connected to the Guggenheim Cristian Nae / Artistic Autonomy in the “Post-Medium Condition” of Art 
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museum where Haacke was supposed to present the work in a 
single-show.  The  effects  of  such  use  of  information  were 
enormous, since the show itself was cancelled, thus raising even 
more  questions  about  censorship  and  the  limits  of  critical 
discourse. 
Haacke’s artworks also have the function of pointing to 
their  context  of  utterance  and  use,  to  the  structures  making 
possible  discourse  and  to  the  way  language  is  formed  and 
discourse  articulated,  as  well  as  to  the  system  of  power 
governing their possible or impossible material existence, the 
very possibility of being uttered as such and the system of their 
exclusion – the study of which formed, for Foucault (1981, 60-4), 
the object of an “archeology of discourse”. In Haacke’s case, the 
performative artistic gesture plays an emancipative role for the 
consciousness  of  his  public,  his  conceptual  interventions 
attempting  to  debunk  the  ideological  mechanisms  concealing 
subsequent  political  realities  behind  the  modernist  aesthetic 
and formalist ideology of the institutionalized art space.  
The  performative  function  of  conceptual  language  is 
sometimes double.  For  the MoMA  Poll, Haacke  actually  asks 
visitors to answer questions in a sociological survey meant to 
obtain  an  actual  response  from  the  audience  to  the  ethical 
problem revealed, namely the visitor’s opinion on the political 
activities  of  Nelson  Rockeffeler  who  was,  at  the  time  both  a 
candidate for presidency and a member of the MoMA board of 
trustees.  In  performative  terms,  he  is  thus  both  asking  a 
question  and  making  a  request.  In  other  situations,  the 
intervention consists simply in reusing the existing language in 
order to force it to reveal hidden patterns of ideology.  
Therefore, we may also observe that conceptual art as a 
critical gesture actually means to perform discourse analysis on 
a series of communicative practices related not only to the art 
world, but to the social and political realities at large. This is 
the  case  of  the  absurd  situations  of  (noncommunication 
encountered  in  most  of  the  conceptual  art  developed  in 
constraining  political  situations  such  as  the  totalitarian 
political  system  of  communist  ex-soviet  countries  and  its 
Eastern European sphere of influence and to a certain extent in 
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and poetical function. It is only when adopting the performative 
stance  towards  such  projects  that  their  entire  meaning  and 
reasons  become  intelligible,  that  is,  their  inherent  semantic 
non-intelligibility makes sense.  
If the logic of communism is a totalizing one, which means 
that a fragment of language and the whole linguistic structure of 
society  are  intricately  related,  a  piece  of  nonsense  is  taken  to 
imply  the  nonsense  of  other  similar  operations  which  sustain 
party  ideology  by  means  of  logical  paradoxes.  The  basic 
assumption  active  here  is  the  same  fundamental  one:  that 
language is an essentially social activity: “people’s relationships 
with language are understood to be a model of their relationships 
with society” (Bobrinskaya 2008, 58). Consequently, to show the 
contradictions inside the structure of language means to show the 
contradictions of society itself. 
The strategic effects obtained by indexical self-erasure of 
the work’s content in the work’s very structure is complemented in 
this  context  by  what  may  be  called  a  politics  of  nothingness, 
echoing  the  subsequent  activity  of  voluntary  “linguistic 
incomprehensibility”  in  Moscow Conceptualism  (Weinhart 2008, 
70-3).  It  happens  in  the  actions  of  the  artistic  group  Collective 
Actions,  performing  seemingly  absurd  activities  with  no 
determinate  content  or  paradoxical  actions  in  which  nothing 
happens except for the event itself. Sometimes, the event becomes 
the  interruption  of  a  routine,  the  suspension  of  an  established 
order of significant events. In their first action, The Appearance 
(1976), two members of the group come out of the forest carrying 
suitcases after a period of waiting. They distribute to the other 
members of the group that simultaneously formed the audience 
certificates of presence as participants to the event and disappear 
as mysteriously as they have arrived. Written language serves to 
record  these  actions  and  comment  upon  the  content  of  the 
accompanying documentary pictures. It serves as a framing device 
for a politically charged notion of “nothingness”, challenging the 
dominant ideology of “work”.  
The performative reasons of conceptualist interventions 
also explain the way incomprehensibility surround the group’s 
play  with  ambiguous  slogans  only  highlighting  the  uncanny 
event  of  their  utterance,  their  very  material  occurrence  in  a Cristian Nae / Artistic Autonomy in the “Post-Medium Condition” of Art 
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specific place. The transparency of the artwork attained in this 
way which serves to appropriate the language of power and to 
divert its meaning in a perfectly self-referential way, since it 
blurs  the  exact  position  of  the  subject  of  speech  and  the 
speaking  subject.  Who  is  speaking  in  actions  of  the  Moscow 
group Collective Actions such as the red banner installed in the 
middle  of  the  forest,  that  reads  “I  do  not  complain  about 
anything and I almost like it here, although I have never been 
here  before  and  know  nothing  about  this  place”  –  is  it  the 
decontextualized banner itself, the artist as the author of the 
text or the reader? The very structure of the utterance is self-
contradictory. If, in the first and second sense, the meaning of 
the  utterance  is  absurd  and  clearly  ironical,  in  the  last 
indexical identification it becomes both ironical and sad, since it 
is  imposing  to  the  disoriented  virtual  reader  (which  in  the 
original context of production, was also a participant) the hasty 
precaution  to  restate  the  official  ideology  that  “everything  is 
fine  and  he  does  not  complain”  about  the  incomprehensible 
situation he is set in.  
The double reading of the works with slogans leads us to 
a  particularly  influential  trope:  irony.  It  is  the  way  irony  is 
inserted  into  the  artistic  mimicry  of  official  beaurocratic 
structures  of  linguistic  production  that  may  explain  both  the 
value  and  the  significance  of  artworks  such  as  those  of  Ilya 
Kabakov or the works with slogans of Collective Actions Group 
in Russia in the late seventies of the last century. As a figure 
pertaining  to  the  performative  dimension  of  language,  irony 
supposes  the  appropriation  and  superposition  of  a  literal, 
primary and indirect, secondary layer of meaning into the same 
utterance. In Hayden White’s account of the trope, irony” is a 
trope that derives its effect of apossitiveness to the description 
of  things  by  playing  upon  the  relation  of  opposition”  (White 
1999, 52). On a different account, irony is considered “a kind of 
metaphor, but one that surreptitiously signals a denial of the 
assertion  of  similitude  or  difference  contained  in  the  literal 
sense of the proposition” (White 1978, 72). Irony denies what it 
affirms in the first stance. Each utterance may thus be read in 
at  least  two  divergent  ways  and  sometimes  the  secondary META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
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meaning may contradict the primary or literal assertion by the 
very act of its utterance.  
This is also the case of Kabakov’s works at the end of the 
seventies  such  as  Schedule  for  Slope  Pail  Dumping  (1980)  or 
Sunday  Evening  (1979).  The  large  enamel  on  masonite  tables 
depict administrative structures regulating daily activities. The 
first work expresses a fictional five-year plan for the communal 
activities  such  as  taking  out  the  garbage  meant  for  a  certain 
block  of  flats,  whose  obvious  symbolic  associations  (the 
rationalization of exclusion) humorously mark the absurdity of 
the task at the level of the society as a whole. Here, not only that 
language  is  annihilated  by  means  of  its  spatialization  in  a 
painting,  but  semantic  rationalization  is  performatively 
interrupted. As far as the second mentioned work is concerned, 
Kabakov  paints  a  similar  table  which  is  astutely  recording 
analyzing and classifying the garments and behavior of all his 
guests  in  a  private  dinner  in  a  highly  bureaucratic  form, 
evaluating it overall with the mark “satisfactory”. The conscious 
mimicry of the language of surveillance and administration and 
the  alleged  internalization  of  the  disciplinary  apparatus 
consisting  in  making  notes  and  archiving  any  activity  of  the 
subjects,  by  means  of  its  unaltered  assumption,  which 
simultaneously points out to the annihilation of subjectivity in 
the very act of repeating the “official” language.  
 
Conclusion 
 
  The arguments and examples presented in the present 
paper  support  the  claim  that  the  performative  dimension  of 
conceptual  art,  which  became  clear  and  paramount  in  the 
works focused  on  identity  politics  in the  eighties,  is  not  only 
inscribed at the core of conceptual artistic processes, which may 
explain the use of textuality and other documentary activities 
as critical devices accompanying, commenting (and sometimes 
replacing) visuality. In stronger terms, it may also become the 
key element in explaining how the idea of artistic autonomy is 
not abandoned together with the aesthetic and medium-specific 
indifference of conceptual art. Understood in terms of critical 
cultural resistance, autonomy is rather redefined as the ability Cristian Nae / Artistic Autonomy in the “Post-Medium Condition” of Art 
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of  language  to  resist  its  heteronomous  manipulation  by  the 
dominant  cultural  ideologies  and  political  power.  Resistance 
may  be  itself  redefined  as  the  performative  re-articulation  of 
language  within  its  conventional  use.  Therefore,  the  implicit 
political dimension of early conceptual art becomes not only an 
epiphenomenal  feature  of  geographically  and  temporally 
limited set specific artworks or a merely stylistic attitude, but a 
central position in accounting for the “post-medium condition” 
of post-conceptual art.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1  According  to  a  much  stronger  institutionalist  perspective,  this  primarily 
nominalist gesture gains legitimacy when uttered by its gesture of exposure 
in the appropriate institutionalized context, be it the Salon of Independents in 
1917 or generally the spaces of the gallery, the museum or other designated 
and circumscribed spaces such as temporary structures of the biennials or the 
interventions  into  the  public  space  as  such  under  an  explicitly  declared 
artistic assumption.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Adorno, Theodor. 1997. Aesthetic Theory. Translated by R. Hullot-
Kentor. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Alberro,  Alexander.  2003.  Conceptual  Art  and  the  Politics  of 
Publicity. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 
Bobrinskaya,  Ekaterina.  2008.  “Moscow  Conceptualism:  Its 
Aesthetics and History.” In Total Enlightenment: Conceptual Art 
in Moscow 1960-1990, edited by Boris Groys, 50-69. Berlin: Hatje 
Cantz. 
Bryson, Norman. 1981. Word and Image: French Painting of the 
Ancient Regime. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Buchloh, Benjamin H. D. 1997. “Conceptual Art 1962-1969: From 
the Aesthetics of Administration to the Critique of Institutions.” 
In  October:  The  Second  Decade  1986-1996,  edited  by  Rosalind 
Krauss et al., 117-155. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 
Burn,  Ian.  1999.  “The  Art  Market:  Affluence  and  Degradation.”  In 
Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology, edited by Alexander Alberro META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – III (2) / 2011 
448 
 
and  Blake  Stimson,  320-333.  Cambridge  MA:  The  MIT  Press. 
Originally published (1975) in Artforum 13 (8): 34-37. 
Colpitt, Francis. 2004. “The Formalist Connection and Originary 
Myths of Conceptual Art.” In Conceptual Art: Theory, Myth and 
Practice, edited by Michael Corris, 28-49. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Crowther,  Paul. 1997. The Language of Twentieth  Century Art. 
New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
Duve,  Thierry  de.  1999.  Kant  after  Duchamp.  Second  edition. 
Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 
Drucker, Johanna. 2004. “The Crux of Conceptualism: Conceptual 
Art,  the  Idea  of  Idea  and  the  Information  Paradigm.”  In 
Conceptual  Art:  Theory,  Myth  and  Practice,  edited  by  Michael 
Corris, 251-268. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Eagleton, Terry. 1991. Ideology: An Introduction. London and New 
York: Verso. 
Foster,  Hal.  1987.  “Postmodernism:  A  Preface.”  In  The  Anti-
Aesthetic. Essays in Postmodern Culture, edited by Hal Foster, IX-
XVI. Port Townsend, Washington: Bay Press. 
Foucault, Michel. 1981. “The Order of Discourse.” In Untying the 
Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, edited by Robert Young, 48-78. 
Boston, London and Oxon: Routledge. 
Godfrey, Tony, 1998. Conceptual Art. London: Phaidon Press. 
Kosuth, Joseph. 2002. Art after  Philosophy and After:  Collected 
Writings, 1966-1990. Edited by Gabriele Guercio. Cambridge MA: 
The MIT Press. 
Krauss, Rosalind. 2000. A Voyage on the North Sea. Art in the Age 
of the Post-Medium Condition. London: Thames & Hudson  
Lippard, Lucy, ed. 2001. Six Years: the Dematerialization of the 
Art Object from 1962 to 1972… Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Morgan, Robert C. 1996. Art into Ideas: Essays on Conceptual Art. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Morley, Simon. 2003. Writing on the Wall. Word and Image in 
Modern Art. London: Thames and Hudson. Cristian Nae / Artistic Autonomy in the “Post-Medium Condition” of Art 
449 
 
 
Shanken,  Edward  A.  2004.  “Art  in  the  Information  Age: 
Technology and Conceptual Art.” In Conceptual Art: Theory, Myth 
and  Practice,  edited  by  Michael  Corris,  235-250.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Smithson,  Robert.  1999.  “Production  for  Production  Sake.”  In 
Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology, edited by Alexander Alberro 
and Blake Stimson, 284-285. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. 
Stimson, Blake. 2004. “Conceptual Work and Conceptual Waste.” 
In Conceptual Art: Theory, Myth and Practice, edited by Michael 
Corris, 282-304. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Osborne,  Peter.  1999.  “Art  and/as  Philosophy.”  In  Rewriting 
Conceptual Art, edited by Michael Newmann, and John Bird, 47-
65. London and New York: Routledge. 
Weinhart,  Martina.  2008.  “Comprehensive  Incomprehensibility: 
Moscow  Conceptualism  and  the  Western  Viewer.”  In  Total 
Enlightenment: Conceptual Art in Moscow 1960-1990, edited by 
Boris Groys, 70-75. Berlin: Hatje Cantz. 
White,  Hayden.  1978.  Tropics  of  Discourse.  Essays  in  Cultural 
Criticism. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
White,  Hayden.  1999.  Figural  Realism.  Studies  in  the  Mimesis 
Effect. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
Wood, Paul. 2002. Conceptual Art. London: Tate Publishing. 
Wood, Paul, ed. 2004. Varieties of Modernism. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press and the Open University. 
 
 
Cristian Nae is PhD Lecturer at the Department of Art History and Theory of 
the “George Enescu” University of Arts, Iasi, Romania. His research interests are 
the theory of contemporary art, aesthetics and the hermeneutics. He translated 
into Romanian Nicolas Bourriaud’s Esthetique relationnelle and Postproduction 
and Roger Pouivet’s Qu’est-qu’une oeuvre d’art? 
 
 
Address: 
Cristian NAE 
Department of Art History and Theory 
George Enescu University of Arts, Iasi 
Str. Sarariei 189, 700451, Iasi, Romania 
Email: cristi_nae@yahoo.co.uk 